Post 9/11 Intelligence Reform Impact and the Way Ahead

Final invest 9/11 intuition Reform Impact and the Way Ahead Daniel Ratner INTL 444 Professor Mead October 8, 2012 Introduction by and by 9/11, an event so shocking, and humiliating to both the Ameri contribute people, and the U. S. Government, vast reforms were identified to watch that an violate of this magnitude never happened again. From the ashes of this despicable act came two major(ip) pieces of experience reform. These documents were the 9/11 missionary work Report and The Intelligence Reform deed and Terrorist Prevent Act of 2004 (IRTPA).Both documents worked to reform the Intelligence Community (IC), and contour current processes to improve the sharing of tidings information, and products. With the wholesale changes mainly through the ITPRA the Intelligence Community is considerably on its vogue to being the major muscle group we need it to be acting as a single unit as opposed to separate and individual muscles all trying to twinge the same heavy weight.With t he findings of the 9/11 commission, the implementations of the IRTPA gravel taken long strides, but what can be done go? We will look at the two pieces of legislation, and then compargon and contrast the sweeping changes, and if the are red in the correct direction. The 9/11 guidance Report In the set off of the 9/11 attacks, a group of politicians both Re normalan and Democrats came together to identify shortfalls and introduce a call for reform. According the written narration, Our aim has non been to assign individual blame.Our aim has been to provide the fullest account of the events border 9/11 and to identify lessons learned. When we as Americans have a major event in the join States, we always look for a scapegoat, the ideas behind the 9/11 commission was built as a bi-partisan group for in effect(p) this reason. The report takes the events of 9/11 and attempts to paint a picture of a major lack of understanding of the threat we face from radical Islam, as well a s other let down with is around the world.The 9/11 report goes deep into the history of the events surrounding 9/11, but truly only spends about 25 pages of the 450 pages report identifying the shortcomings, and way ahead. Now while this is a macro run across of the reforms require, it does leave overmuch to the imagination. Post 9/11 Reform As we look at the reforms recommended we appear that the commission broke the recommendations into major groups, they divided them into ways to give Overall Government Reform.This is subdivided into five categories, a new Unity of sweat between Foreign and Domestic operations in an attempt to command primacy in different types of operations to view the proper agency is doing the correct job, A Unity of Effort for the Intelligence Community, Unity of Effort in Sharing Information, Unity of Effort of in the Congress, and finally how to emend organizing Homeland defenses. epoch these are all important, the major issue was the lack of own ership and sharing of discussion between governmental agencies.As the 9/11 commission pushed for counter nemesisism reform, it excessively pointed to a need for intelligence information reform. the IC reform was aimed at the way we collect process and disseminate intelligence. The 9/11 commission strike to identify, whether the government is organized adequately to direct resources and build the intelligence capabilities it will need non just for countering terrorism, but for the broader range of national security challenges in the decades ahead. This viewpoint looks at the depicted object Intelligence Agencies and get hold of to focus their power to be both effective, and balanced. Coupled with these factors the 9/11 commission identified sextupleter major problems, the structural barriers to performing joint intelligence work, lack of common standards and practices across the distant- internal divide. dual-lane caution of national intelligence capabilities, weak capacit y to set priorities and move resources, also umteen an(prenominal) jobs, and too entangled and secret. Structural Barriers To Performing Joint Intelligence WorkAlong with the issues of trying to keep ahead of our enemies, we must also be able to share our information with other intelligence agencies, and our allies. As the 9/11 report shows theme intelligence is still organized around the collection disciplines of the home agencies, not the joint mission. The importance of unified, all-source abbreviation cannot be overstated. Without it, it is not possible to connect the dots. No one component holds all the relevant information. bit all agencies collect information, only through joint integration can we truly paint an undefiled assessment of the facts.As a reference, the report cites the Goldwater Nichols legislation of 1986, in which Operations as a whole were better envisioned though joint co-operative training. It shows the strengths of these types of events and why we must incorporate more joint intelligence to be successful. Lack Of Common Standards and Practices Across the Foreign-Domestic Divide This portion of the report goes on to show the issues we have in the cases of both database practisement and dissemination of information. In cases of information gathered both home and abroad, there are issues with integration and synchronization of this workflow.Many have cited and shown how across the IC there are multiple databases, of which there is no conduit to share information, multiple programs collecting the same data, but are not cross-matched, and in many cases free entries are made, and then not managed creating an abundance of information unable to be processed due to a lack of manpower. Divided Management of internal Intelligence Capabilities As the IC swelled in the interest World War 2 and Cold War eras, we saw the abilities of many agencies in collections dwindle and collapse.The report shoes the degradation of the CIAs ability to collect IMINT, and SIGINT. As the NSA, NRO NGIA, and other have been created, the HUMINT, OSINT and other intelligence collected by the CIA has had issues being validated due to the inability to task other agencies assets. Some of these issues were solved through their acquisition of their own satellites and some reform, but again we see information that is collected by a sole agency, which is not easily shared or validated by an outside source. tripping Capacity to Set Priorities and Move ResourcesThe task organization of the IC and the way in which it is managed fell on the Director of Central Intelligence, giving the CIA free reign in many cases, and also in many cases too much ability to mismanage or squander resources. As they struggle to manage these resources, and ensure all members of the IC are covered for what they need, there was little oversight in the ability to grade collection efforts. Moreover, there was little though given to how to best manage , what they coll ect or the way they collect it. Too Many Jobs As of the time of the 9/11 report the DCI had three jobs.Running of the CIA, manage the other members of the IC, and head analyst for the professorship of the unite States. Any one of these positions is a capstone to a successful career in the days of 9/11 it fell on one person. As the report goes on to show, is the fact that, No recent DCI has been able to do all three effectively. normally what loses out is management of the intelligence community This overtasking of an individual is not only reckless, but in many cases gave too much power to the CIA. The report finds that the DCI has three major shortcomings.They find that the DCI lacks the ability to control the bullion allocated to the IC, the ability to remove or replace agency heads, and the ability to set the quality control and normalisation of collection efforts. Too Complex and riddle As if all the previous five findings were not enough, we also see the issue of a cumber some and hidden group of organizations. At the time of the 9/11 report, the IC was comprised of 15 agencies, mainly managed by a single entity. This coupled with no clear roadmap to how the groups interact, whom they report to, and how they fund operations.Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) Out of the ashes of the events of 9/11 and the reforms brought forth by the 9/11 Commission report, came the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). This legislation cognise as S. 2845was introduced by SenatorSusan CollinsofMaine. The bill was enacted after being signed by the President on December 17, 2004. This legislation strove to take the 9/11 Commissions findings and implement them into law. As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, we mentioned six major problems the IC faced.Being that the IC was managed mainly based on the National Security Act of 1947, the IRTPA brought changes to the IC by taking the bad and refining the good of each item. The major change seen in the IRTPA was the presentation of the Director of National Intelligence. As we had seen in the 9/11 report, the DCI was way too overtasked, and the need for an Intelligence Community to have a director. The Structural Barriers to Performing Joint Intelligence Work In the take fire of 9/11 the Joint Intelligence Community Council.This council Chaired by the Director of National Intelligence, is comprised of all major Presidential advisors. It is chartered to assist the Director of National Intelligence in developing and implementing a joint, coordinated national intelligence effort to protect national security This council also in the matter of advising the legislative branch, may make recommendations to improve the IC. Lack of Common Standards and Practices Across the Foreign-Domestic Divide With the creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) came the call for a performance of common services. This charge stands to ensure that s ervices previously not shared, managed, or understood are standardized. It also stands to provide a set of standards for the agencies to follow, and hence stay regulated. Divided Management Of National Intelligence Capabilities Under the National Security Act of 1947, the DCI was the head of the IC, but under the IRTPA, a new position was enabled. The new position Director of National Intelligence, appointed by the President of the United States. This change gave the DCI more oversight of the CIA, and gave the President a subject matter expert, one who had a single focus job.This also gives the DNI the ability to manage the tasking of national collection assets, a job not really performed before. Weak Capacity to Set Priorities and Move Resources In the case of the ability to set priorities, formerly again the charge goes to the DNI. He is charged to establish objectives, priorities, and guidance for the intelligence community to ensure well-timed(a) and effective collection, proc essing, analysis, and dissemination This charge gives the DNI the ability manage resources, requirements, conflict resolution between agencies to include the scotch consumption of assets, and collection platforms.The only person the DNI must concede to the President. Too Many Jobs While we had an issue of the DCI having too many jobs before, some might say that the DNO now has too many jobs. This is a misconception, since the DNI has no intelligence agency to manage, rather he has department heads to manage that job. He instead focuses on the seamless and integrated manager of the whole gambit of intelligence. Too Complex and Secret The final goal of the IRTPA served to take the secret and lack of oversight out of the IC. The establishment of an Inspector General to the DNI was enacted under the IRTPA.This office serves to manage estimable matters, settle complaints of favoritism, and ensure civil liberties are upheld through the actions of the IC and concurrence with National a nd International Laws. different Changes Driven by the IRTPA The four findings recommended by the legislation are the following (1) Long-term success in the contend on terrorism demands the use of all elements of national power, including diplomacy, military action, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, sparing policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. 2) To win the war on terrorism, the United States must assign to economic and diplomatic capabilities the same strategic priority that is assigned to military capabilities. (3) The legislative and executive branches of the Government of the United States must commit to robust, long-term investments in all of the tools necessary for the foreign policy of the United States to successfully accomplish the goals of the United States. (4) The investments referred to in paragraph (3) will require increased funding to United States foreign affairs programs in general, and to priority areas as described in this ti tle in particular.By breaking these findings out, we can better see how the IC can transform and flex the major muscle it has the ability to do. While there were pages and pages of changes, and background these four findings standout as the major players in policy reforms. Long-term Success in the War on Terrorism To be successful in the war on terror, we must lend oneself all possible assets and allies assets to our advantage. To do this we need to focus our efforts by sharing information, and ensuring that agencies are receiving by the way and relevant updates to collected intelligence to ensure overall success.This sharing is critical to both foreign and domestic interests. Balance of Diplomatic, Economic and Military Influences The even balance of lethal, non-lethal and Humanitarian actions must be monitored and controlled. Too much use of any of these can degrade the ability of the United States and its allys effect in foreign actions. It is also important to remember that ev en in an attempt to show ourselves as a hard target we must show compassion and understanding to those less fortunate than us.This is a necessity if only because we must show the rest of the world that we are not so desolate of emotion that we can relate with their plights and ways of life. Overall Governmental Commitment to Success The war of terror is a marathon not a race. Only though the applied funding, legislative drive to ensure resources, and the executive branch push to allow success of the IC can we succeed in the war on terror. We cannot allow political infighting, election cycles, opinion polls, or other media-like reports to stop our drive for the end-state.While not always pretty, cost-effective, and popular, the needs of the IC to gather raw data must be protected. Added distractors such as political infighting in cases such as the passing, or re-authorization of the Patriot Act are great examples of the dangers the IC faces in achieving its goals. Commitment to Succ ess and its Costs As stated above, this marathon is not always going to be cost-effective. Emerging technologies, payouts to sources, replacing of equipment, and other costs, not always made privy to the general public must be supported.Failure to the fund the IC can be detrimental to their success. While oversight is needed to ensure embezzlement is not a factor, the budget increases the IC requests should not be delayed or jeopardized by political adversaries, nor used as a talking point. This is currently seen in the $500 gazillion defense cuts enacted by supercommittee legislations as face now. Conclusion As we see the changes made in the past times 8 years since its inception, the IRTPA has helped the IC, but has not fixed it yet.While the DNI creation was a good thing, we do still see cases of the DNI have too much responsibility, and too much work. In some cases the added changes have brought more costs in bureaucratic startup, oversight, and staffing. While the need to sepa rate the DCI from the rest of the agencies was important, the IRTPA has limited the CIAs abilities an a variety of ways. Other advantages have been the information sharing of intelligence. The sharing has instituted policies and procedures as well as shared technology serves to better share information in a common platform.All things being combined, the IRTPA has been a game changer for the IC, only through reform, and through lessons learned will we strengthen and improve our practices, belongings our country safer. Bibliography 9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission Report Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Report, Washington, D. C. U. S. Government Printing Office, 2004. Andrew, Christopher. For Presidents Eyes Only Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush. New York Harper Press. Beckner, Christian.Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations An Analysis. http//www. hlswatch. com/sitedocs/Impleme nting%20the%20911%20Commission%20Recs. pdf (accessed October 03, 2012). Congress, 108th. perception REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004. 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